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I. Introduction
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first section, I examine briefly,
from a developmental perspective, the major theoretical positions dominating the
literature on adult cognition. Two criteria are considered: first, how compatible
are the theories with the notion that thinking systems develop within living environ-
ments? Second, what are the implicit or explicit assumptions of the theories con-
cerning the quintessential developmental problem of growth.
In the second section I consider the general class of levels of processing nodels.
These frameworks, unlike other theories of adult cognition, have been widely adopted by
developmentalists. I argue that developmental theories are particularly compatible
with such models because they are themselves variants of levels of processing approaches
Both emphasize three major issues: the importance of involuntary memory, the activity of
the subject and the goal of that activity, and headfitting, i.e., the compatibility be-
tween what is known and what can be known. To illustrate, I compare current levels of
processing models and similar developmental theories, notably European structuralism, as
represented byPiaget, and Soviet dialecticism, as represented by Leont'ev, Vygotsky and
Zinchenko. The European tradition and the emergence of level of processing frameworks
converged to assert a powerful influence on developmental studies of cognition.
Throughout the chapter I have attempted to demonstrate where developmental data are
particularly relevant for an issue of concern for adult theories and where adult
models can guide the theory construction of developmentalists. To date, however,
the dominant approach to human cognition has been teleological and there is an im-
plicit acceptance that human thought processes reach a steady state, i.e., become
static and immutable at maturity. I argue here that a consideration of ontogenetic
factors would increase our understanding not only of the child but of the adult thinker.
II. Theories of Cognition and the Problem of Growth
The dialogue between developmental psychology and adult cognition has been less
than avital force in the evolution of either discipline; why this lack of communication?
2At the trivial level it is true that the adherents often fail to follow each other's
literatures, an oversight which is inevitable given the information overload resulting
from the proliferation of research outlets. I have been reduced to treating the task
of following current controversy in adult cognition as a semantic shadowing task; I only
divert my full attention to the relatively unattended channel when a topic of particular
personal salience is raised.
In general, developmental psychologists have shown a lamentable insensitivity to
the need for theory guided research, perhaps due to the origins of the discipline, rooted
as they are in clinical and educational practice. As such it is not uncommon to encounter
developmental cognitive psychologists who are not only unaware of major trends in adult
cognition, but are also oblivious to the need for such awareness. By the same token,
cognitive psychologists often fail to consider pertinent developmental data even when such
data could provide the optimal test for a question of interest. Cross-fertilization
among the disciplines could be of help to both.
At a more fundamental level, the crucial issues for a developmentalist, i.e., change
and growth, have not in the past been major concerns of adult models. In fact, adult
models share major problems which are most apparent when the topic of cognitive growth
is considered. It is precisely because of these characteristic weaknesses that develop-
mental psychologists seeking theories have often looked elsewhere for guidance. In the
next section I will illustrate this point with a cursory examination of the main trends
in adult cognition. The concentration is on how the models speak to developmental con-
cerns and how developmental data can be used to investigate some crucial issues for the
models.
A. Information processing models: The computer metaphor.
Craik and Lockhart's (1972) original paper was primarily motivated by a reaction to
the then dominant metaphor of adult cognition, the computer. I do not wish to reiterate
their well-known criticisms here; instead I would like to add a further complaint arising
from a developmental perspective. Computer metaphor models concentrate on the flow of
3information in and between the major architectural structures of the system (STM, LTM,
etc.). The primary issues are when, where, and how, rather than what information is
processed. The principal structures of the system are fixed; they do not grow, neither
do they function in dynamic interaction with a meaningful environment. Shaw and
Bransford (1977) characterized the systems as "mechanistic," "purposeless," and "passive."
A system that cannot grow, or show adaptive modification to a changing environment is a
strange metaphor for human thought processes which are constantly changing over a life
span of the individual and the socio-cultural evolution of the race (Kvale, 1975; Riegel,
1975). This is the major criticism of such models raised by ecological psychologists,
for example, Shaw and Bransford who believe that a
man-machine analogy becomes a hindrance rather than an aid to psychological
theory when it derails our thinking about how living creatures gather and
act upon knowledge in dynamic natural contexts. Such questions can in no
way be reduced to questions of how information is represented, stored, or
retrieved from storage by static devices in artificially controlled experi-
ments. (Shaw & Bransford, 1977, pp. 4-5)
Notwithstanding these obvious limitations for a field devoted to understanding cog-
nitive growth, theory-oriented developmental psychologists did adopt the prevailing
metaphor, with some success, but also with many attendant problems that can serve to
illustrate some limitations to the original model.
First the modal model of this type makes a sharp distinction between structure
and process. This distinction has not gone unchallenged even within the domain of
adult cognition (Winograd, 1975). As Newell (1972) has pointed out,what we regard as
structure and what we regard as process is very much a function of the theoretical
viewpoint we adopt. But this is even more troublesome for developmentalists for what
we regard as structural must undergo change, if by structure we mean some limitation
imposed by the impoverished state of the child's knowledge base (Brown, 1975; Chi, 1978).
A more specific type of structure limitation has been suggested by the computer
models; it is more akin to the notion of channel capacity. If children do poorly on
a rote recall task, one might ask whether this is because of some capacity limitation,
4defined in terms of presence or absence of a major system, amount of space with one of
the systems, or rate of decay. The notion that immature learners do suffer from some
form of limited memory capacity is a dominant one (Chi, 1976), and it is only recently
that a series of ingenious developmental studies (Chi, 1976, and Huttenlocher & Burke,
1976) have come to grips with the difficulties in distinguishing between the "capacity"
limitations of the immature that are structural or procedural. In summary of this work,
there appears to be no compelling data to suggest that capacity differences, defined
by presence or absence of an architectural system (e.g., STM), amount of space in one
of the architectural units (e.g., the number of slots in STM), or in terms of durability
of information in these systems, differentiates the child from the adult thinker
(Belmont, 1972; Belmont & Butterfield, 1969; Brown, 1974; Chi, 1976; Wickelgren, 1975).
What does hamper the inexperienced is the paucity of strategic processes available to
the system and the debilitating effect of an impoverished knowledge base (Brown, 1978a).
The studies of Chi concerned with STM limitations and iconic memory in children illus-
trate the complexity of separating out process and structure, an illustration that is
no less informative to the student of adult cognition.
Chi's (1976, 1978) theory is a good example of an information-processing develop-
mental model which emphasizes the problems of an impoverished knowledge base. Long-
term memory is seen as the repository of rules, strategies, and operations which can
be used to make more efficient use of a limited capacity system; young children have
not yet acquired these routines. In addition, Chi believes that the child's knowledge
base is deficient in at least three ways: (a) the amount of information it contains,
(b) the organization and internal coherence of that informaiton, and (c) the number
of available routes by which it can be readhed. These differences impose several lim-
itations on the child's information-processing abilities, even in such simple situa-
tions as reading information from the icon or maintaining information in STM (Chi, 1975,
1976). Such basic cognitive processes as ease of retrievability, and speed of encoding,
naming, and recognition are all influenced by restrictions imposed by an impoverished
5knowledge base.
Although models such as Chi's provide some insight into what might develop within
an information-processing framework, there are still some interesting difficulties when
one tries to account for qualitative rather than quantitative growth. How does the
system become rich, rather than impoverished, if by that we mean more than a mere accum-
ulation of facts? How does the organization and internal cohesion of information change
qualitatively with age? What is meant by the number of routes by which information is
reached? Others have noted the problems with basic memory metaphors (Bransford & Franks,
1976; Neisser, 1967) with their emphasis on searching in discrete locations. If we
really believe in an accumulation of facts, which become increasingly accessible by means
of well-trodden routes, we must face fundamental problems when it comes to dealing with
questions such as, how such a system can recognize novelty (Hbffding, 1891; Neisser,
1967) and why the expert does not take longer to "access" his known facts than the novice
(Bransford, Nitsch & Franks, 1977).
B. The episodic-semantic distinction.
One of the most influential distinctions to be made in the area of memory in recent
years is that between semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972). But the terms have
come to mean different things to different people, and it is not at all clear that they
produce either an exhaustive or exclusive classification. The confusion that has fol-
lowed the idiosyncratic and varying usage of the terms has been dealt with elsewhere
(Nelson & Brown, 1978). Here I will consider, briefly, the distinction in connection
with how thinking systems grow.
In view of the controversy concerning terminology I will state explicitly my use
of the terms. The term episodic is used to refer to a form of memory input leading both
to remembered autobiographical events (Tulving, 1972), e.g., what happened on one's
fifth birthday, and to the formation of generalized event structures, or scripts (Nelson,
1977; Schank, 1975), e.g., what you expect to happen in a restaurant, at a store, etc.
Both Schank (1975) and Nelson (1977) conceive of these generalized event structures as
6important components of an underlying conceptual memory, and as the most important com-
ponent for the young child. The term semantic memory is reserved for the storing of
information about words and concepts represented in the language, i.e., the strictly
linguistic (lexical or semantic).
There has been a tendency in current developmental research to classify all of
the child's real-world knowledge as semantic knowledge (Brown, 1975; see also Naus &
Halasz, this volume) thereby avoiding the central question of how semantic structures
develop from episodic experience. For example, there is an increasing body of liter-
ature concerned with the very young child's memory for non-linguistic information,
such as spatial layouts (Siegel & White, 1975), spatial locations (Acredolo, Pick &
Olsen, 1975; Harris,1973) and actions (Foellinger & Trabasso, 1977). But, these types
of memories are neither "semantic" nor "episodic" as these terms have previously been
defined. Clearly one of the major developmental questions, especially in the preschool
period, is how such- nonverbal -memory relates to verbal memory, as well as vice versa.
Labelling both types of representation semantic obscures rather than illuminates, the
problem.
The crucial developmental question has been raised and dropped by most theorists
concerned with some variant of the episodic-semantic distinction. For example, Tulving
(1972) stated that:
relatively little is known about the role that the perceptual system and
episodic memory play in the storage of information into semantic memory.
Problems of acquisition of semantic information, and problems of modifi-
cation of existing semantic structures, have not yet been studied by-
students of semantic memory. . . (Tulving, 1972, p. 393).
This statement emphasizes the uncertain relation between semantic and episodic memory
and the role of experience in the formation of both. Earlier, Posner and Warren (1971)
were concerned with how automatic structures (semantic memory) are derivable from traces
(episodic experience) but they too dropped the question. Similarly, Kintsch asked how
does "general knowledge (semantic memory) develop on the basis of particular exper-
iences (episodic memory)" although he notes "this question need not concern us here"
(Kintsch, 1974, p. 79). Kintsch was also sensitive to the fact that -noaverbal rep-
resentation of knowledge must exist for he states that:
It is unlikely that all knowledge can be represented in the same way.
Propositional knowledge, which will be our sole concern, is primarily
verbal, though it is possilbe to represent nonverbal information by such
means as well . . . . On the other hand, analog representation of know-
ledge may underlie sensorimotor memory. The decision to neglect non-
propositional knowledge here by no means implies a judgment that only verbal
sources of knowledge are worth considering for the psychologist. It merely
reflects the state of the art today (Kintsch, 1974, p. 15).
This recurrent problem has especial importance for the developmental psychologist who
must ask: how does the memory system of the young child encode and reconcile nonverbal .
and verbal sources of knowledge? How does the latter emerge from the former? Nelson's
(1977) attempts to deal with this issue are of great importance for developmental
theory and the adult models themselves could be enriched by a consideration of the de-
velopmental issue.
C. Semantic memory models.
Semantic memory models are currently fashionable and controversial (Collins &
Loftus, 1976). I do not wish to enter this arena but will consider the models as they
relate to the problem of growth. An excellent discussion of growth and semantic models
can be found in several recent papers of Bransford and his colleagues (Bransford &
Franks, 1976; Bransford & Nitsch, 1977; Bransford, Nitsch & Franks, 1977), and there-
fore I will only touch on the main points.
The main controversy engrossing semarktic memory modelers concerns the nature of
the organization in LTM, whether this is characterized as sets of features (Smith,
Shoben & Rips, 1974), or networks of relationships (Collins & Loftus, 1976). The main
game played by the participants is some variant of a verification task. Subjects are
required to verify that a canary has skin, or is yellow. The latter they do more
quickly--why? Whatever theory is espoused, a basic tenant is that the ease of verifi-
cation can be accounted for by making assumptions concerning the preexisting structure
of already acquired information.
8Theories of semantic memory therefore attempt to account for knowing
solely on the basis of the structure of already acquired information. So-
called "process" models of semantic memory are involved with elucidating
how one uses already stored information to retrieve facts, make comparisons,
etc. However these notions of "process" are not equivalent to the processes
involved in the development of knowing. From the present perspective, the
important processes involve knowing how to do something to go beyond what one
knows right now (Bransford, Nitsch & Franks, 1977, ms. p.
The major developmental forays in this area have been studies showing that children
have networks similar to adults (Nelson & Kosslyn, 1975) but again without considera-
tion of how these structures arose or developed.
Although it would be simplistic to deny that an important aspect of understanding
involves the relationship between what is now to be understood and what is already known,
Bransford and his colleagues are certainly right in emphasizing that it is at least
equally important to consider how novelty is comprehended. Novelty cannot simply be
understood as a recombination of already available information and this is nowhere more
apparent than when one considers the problem of development. Children are universal
novices; they must cope with novelty constantly. Semantic memory models cannot help
us answer the problem of growth for they have not been primarily concerned with the
issue of how one becomes a network, or feature repository, or how there develops a
structure through which spreading activation can activate. This problem is isomorphic
which the previously-mentioned question of how an abstract decontextualized system of
knowledge evolves from the personal episodic experience of the child (Nelson, 1977;
Nelson & Brown, 1978). The virtual equation of understanding with contacting previous
knowledge must bring such models face to face with the problems of growth, novelty
and preformism, problems which present difficulties for all psychological theories.
D. Schema theories of knowing.
Schema theories of human thought have been popular at least since Kant's (1787)
Critique of Pure Reason; they have never been totally in abeyance although in the hey-
day of radical behaviorism they lurked predominantly under the cover of the "soft"
areas of developmental (Piaget, 1928) and social (Allport & Postman, 1945; Bartlett,
1932) psychology.
9It is probably true that some version of a schema theory is the dominant metaphor
of current cognitive psychologists; at least it is a very healthy contender for that
position, vying only with the competing information-processing computer metaphor.
Computer metaphcrs themselves have begun to incorporate schema-like entities into their
conceptualization. Minsky's (1975) frame notion, which has been favored by workers in
the Artificial Intelligence field (Charniak, 1975; Winograd, 1975), and Schank's scripts
and plans are basically schemata notions (Schank & Abelson, 1975). The LNR group has
not been entirely uninfluenced by AI and they have also developed theories of schemata-
driven cognition (Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Norman, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).
The defining features of schema theories are somewhat difficult to specify. The
use of the term schema is widespread, vague and not always overladen with meaning. One
of my favorite games is to remove the work schema from a paper written in schematese
and look for changes in meaning. Take, for example, the sentence "preexisting know-
ledge schemata function to orient people to interpret a message in a certain way."
Where is the loss of clarity in removing the word schemata. It is somewhat surprising
to find that there rarely is a loss of meaning following such ablation tactics. The
above sentence was one of my own, by the way, and I had already been through the paper
eradicating superfluous schemata. To be fair, many of the more recent theories are far
more precise in their use of the term (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977), but there is still
an abundance of needless schematese. in contemporary cognitive psychology.
The major scaffolding of schema theories seems to be some version of the Piagetian
assimilation and accommodation interaction, or the reflection, refraction transactions
of Soviet dialectic theories (Wozniak, 1975). Assimilation is the function by which
the events of the world are incorporated into preexisting knowledge structures while
accommodation is the process by which the existing knowledge structures are modified
in accordance with novel events. By the reciprocal influence of input on preexisting
concepts and extant knowledge on input the thinker comes to know his world. There
10
are nontrivial problems associated with both terms. Recent theorists have taken
divergent opinions on the issue, ranging from those who have few problems with assim-
ilation but question how accommodation occurs (Anderson, 1977), those who accept
accommodation but express concerns with assimilition (Neisser, 1976a), and those who
appear to be disconcerted by both (Turvey, 1977). One cannot legitimately consider
assimilation without accommodation or vice versa, as they are twin mechanisms in a
dynamic transaction. But I will try to give the flavor of objections to bott processes,
as if they could be separated. In keeping with the focus of this chapter I will con-
centrate only on issues of critical interest to the basic developmental questions:
growth and change.
A major criticism of schema theories in adult cognition is that they are basically
assimilation models. Mechanisms which permit acquisition and articulation of schemata
are not specified in sufficient detail to afford an adequate developmental perspective.
How are existing conceptions modified in the face of inconsistent input? How do such
theories deal with novelty? To say that "learning may be dealt with by supposing that
when a radically new input is encountered a [new schema]without variables is constructed'
(Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, ms. P. 42), does not tell us either how we know it is a
new input or how we construct a new schema. Similarly it is undoubtedly true that much
schema growth can be accounted for by the twin processes of schema generalization and
schema specification (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) but the theory is quite vague concerning
the mechanisms and conte<ts which would permit such development.
The problem of growth is not only one of gradual extension and refinement of
schemata but an adequate theory must be able to account for major changes in perspective
(Anderson, 1977) or paradigmatic shifts of theory or world view (Kuhn, 1970). It must
also deal with emotionally-based resistance to such major cognitive reorganization for
it is true that inconsistencies and counterexamples are often assimilated into schemata
to which a person is heavily committed, as Abelson's (1973) Cold Warrior example can
illustrate. Accommodation is not the necessary result of inconsistent input. What
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then would constitute necessary or sufficient conditions for a schema shift, or major
accommodation, to occur? How does our preexisting knowledge change as a function of
experience?--by gradual extension--by dynamic shifts in perspectives? (for a detailed
discussion of this point see Anderson, 1977).
There are those for whom the problems of accommodation are relatively trivial for
one must first account for assimilation. Gibsonian-attuned theorists find the latter
to be the more problematic concept. Assimilation presupposes at least two interrelated
assumptions that render the concept implausible for Gibsonians and embarrassing for
schema theorists whose consciousness has been raised by this school (Neisser, 1976a).
First, one can know only by reference to prior knowledge. Closely linked to this problem
is the age-old one of preformism, or radical nativism, i.e., the organism must come
prewired with .a set of schemata; some knowledge about the world must be present from
the very beginning.
The problem of preformism has been dealt with in depth by Shaw & Bransford (1977).
No one really questions that phylogenetic attunement of some kind must preset an organ-
sim to interact with his environment. Radical empiricism is no longer a viable tenant,
for most contemporary theories accept some form of genetic attunement, some primitive
universals, even though there is considerable discussion concerning what these might
be.
The notion that assimilation involves epistemic mediation of some form is also
a theoretically controversial one (Ttrvey, 1977). Gibsonians, as direct though
critical s realists, believe that everything we can perceive we perceive directly and
there is no problem for such theories of input change or internal representation. Schema
theorists on the other hand do inVoke some epistemic mediation. Truly constructive
theories are awkwardly autistic; if we truly construct our world, and we all corntruct
it on the basis of our unique configuration of individual experience, it would be
difficult to account for how 'accurately we perceive our world and how constant is the
pattern of major ontogenetic change. Neisser (1976a) reaches a form of compromise in
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that he assumes that perceiving does not change the world, it changes the perceiver,
so that information in the world is only significant, indeed can only be picked up,
if there is "a developmental format ready to accept it." For a full discussion of
these differences the reader is referred to Neisser (1976a), Turvey and Shaw (this
volume), Bransford, Franks, Morris, and Stein (this volume), and Shaw & Bransford (1977).
Thus a major problem with assimilation theories is the now familiar arguement
that it is only possible to understand current input by reference to preexisting struc-
tures. This is as problematic for schema theories as for any other. And it is exacer-
bated by the tendency of some schema theorists to maintain the terminology of a memory
metaphor by referring to schemata as if they were knowledge structures stored in the
head. Schemata have slots into which things fit; frames often read very much like
static places to put things in. But if this is so then one could only know by rifling
through available schemata until one finds a suitable fit; or one could invoke a notion
of content-addressable schemata!! This is one of the common pitfalls that schema the-
ories wish to avoid. Experience does not result in the formation of an inner replica
of an event in the head, but it functions more by altering or tuning the organism in
such a way that it will see all subsequently related events in a new light. Reconsti-
tuted schema theories (Neisser, 1976a) do go part of the way in avoiding the content-
addressable problem by this notion of tuning which is the result of the dynamic, re-
ciprocal relation between the current cognitive-perceptual situation and the significant
information in the environment (Bransford et al., 1977). Schemata are not filed in a
library system in the mind. As Neisser points out, "someone who has a currently in--
active schema should not be thought of as an owner of a particular kind of mental
property. He is just an organism with a particular potentiality. His inactive schema
are not objects but aspects of the structure of his nervous system" (Neisser, 1976a,
p. 62). Similarly, Bransford's notion of experience setting the stage (Bransford &
Franks, 1976) for graspirg the significance of an event is a tuning notion which has much
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in common with the Gibsonian concepts of the mutual compatibility between the organism's
effectivities (goal-directed functions which reflect its potential actions) and the
environmental affordances (Turvey & Shaw, this volume). There are major differences,
to be sure, between the Gibsonian ecological theories and even reconstituted schema
theories (Neisser 1976a), and these differences center on the problem of epistemic
mediation (Turvey, 1977). But there is a convergence on the important issue which
remains the mutual compatitility of the organism and its naturally evolving environ-
mental niche.
In summary, the fundamental problems facing schema theories are the same as those
that must eventually be confronted by any adequate psychological model. They must be
able to deal with such issues as: ---- with what preexisting structures must the nascent
organism come equipped; how do these structures undergo change with age and experience;
how does the organism go beyond its current state of knowing; how are the perceptual
and cognitive systems pre-attunedby experience; in short, how do we account for cognitive
growth. One of the major influences of the ecological theories (Shaw & Bransford, 1977;
Turvey, 1977) is that they force us to address just those issues even if they cannot
yet resolve them.
E. Developmental Theories
In the last stop in this quick tour of theories of cognition and the concept of
growth, I will now consider briefly developmental theories, lumped together into one
uneasy category. It is a natural step to go from a consideration of schema theories
to the developmental literature as most of the dominant theories of cognitive develop-
ment are based on some schema-like construct. This is true of European (Binet &
Henri, 1894; Piaget, 1971), Soviet (Reigel, 1975; Wozniak, 1975), and American (Werner,
1948) psychology, in some guise or another. It would, of course, be impossible to
give even a thumbnail description of the viable developmental models, and in keeping
with the main focus of this section of the paper, I will concentrate only on how de-
velopmental models cope with growth. One might imagine that a consideration of theories
14
specifically addressed to growing organisms might provide some answers not found in
adult models. A concern with growth should be a defining feature of a theory of cog-
nitive development. Unfortunately this is not so; developmental theories have also
been adept at avoiding the basic issue of growth by describing what develops rather
than concentrating on how growth occurs. Indeed, just as a major problem with adult
models is that they are generally silent on the issue of how thinking systems grow
or change, so too, a major objection to many developmental models is that at best
they provide a description of the stages or states of development but they cannot
account for the transformations that lead to growth (Nelson, 1977). There is consid-
erable disagreement surrounding even such basic issues as whether cognitive growth is
a continuous process that proceeds slowly and gradually or whether it consists of a
set of abrupt stage-like leaps (Flavell, 1971; Toussaint, 1974).
To illustrate how developmental models have difficulty with the concept of growth,
I will use a somewhat extreme example. At a recent conference concerned with intelli-
gence, Klahr (1976) presented a simulation of children's performance on Piagetian con-
servation problems. But, in order to successfully model this development Klahr would
need to build into his system some accommodation-like process. In short, to model
growth one must understand it. Neisseras the discussant of the paper,pointed out
that this is exactly what systems like Klahr's cannot do, for we do not yet understand
the processes of growth. According to Neisser, the system proposed by Klahr
. . does not undergo accommodation; it does not learn. Klahr agrees
that the issue of self-modification is central to the conception of
intelligence, but neither his own system nor any of those reviewed by
him meet this issue successfully. For better or worse my (Neisser's)
1963 claim that Artificial Intelligence has not modeled cognitive devel-
opment remains valid. There is a reason for this. The development of
human intelligence occurs in a real environment with coherent proper-
ties of its own. Many of these properties vary greatly from one situation
to another; others remain invariant at a deeper level. As long as pro-
grams do not represent this ernvironment systematically, in at least some
of its complexity, they cannot represent cognitive growth either.
(Neisser, 1976b, pp. 143-144).
Thus for Neisser, as well as for ecological theorists (Shaw & Bransford, 1977;
Turvey & Shaw, this volume) the minimum unit of analysis must be the activity of
15
the organism in its natural environmental niche.
It is perhaps not too surprising that Klahr could not successfully capture the
essence of accommodation in a computer simulation. But how successful in this regard,
has been the pivotal developmental model, Piagetian theory. I have a sneaking suspi-
cion that Piaget's theory is a gigantic projective test and it is possible to find
there what one is looking for, surely a confirmation of Piaget's basic tenet. What
follows is my interpretation of the essence of the theory. Piaget's theory rests on
his changing notion of equilibration which is seen by some to be a homeostatic mech-
anism (Riegel, 1975). The organism is constantly seeking balance and stability.
Every interaction with the environment precipitates a compensating equilibration ac-
tivity consisting of both an assimilative and accommodative function. The end state
of these reciprocal forces is balance. A problem here is that such a homeostatic
notion would serve to maintain a child at a given level of development and one major
issue has been how Piaget extracts himself from the dilemma of providing a basically
homeostatic model to account for growth.
Piaget is not insensitive to this issue as some of his critics would have us be-
lieve (Riegel, 1974) and in his more recent writings he has introduced the homeorhetic
(Pufall, 1977) processes of physical and reflective abstraction (Piaget, 1970, 1971).
These are not easy concepts to come to grips with and luckily, for my purposes here,
it is sufficient to point out that the major questions that Piaget is attempting to
answer in his more recent work focus on the problem of growth. Indeed, Riegel (1974)
has characterized Piaget's own development as one of three stages, the functional,
the structural and now the transformational periods.
Thus, it would seem that even developmental theories have not yet arrived at a
§atisfactory conception of change and growth; as with adult theories the tendency is
to fall back on an accumulation notion sometimes accompanied by reference to some
unspecified qualitative reorganization at some unspecified critical stages. In defense
of such theories, however, it should be said that they do address the issue; it is a
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constant concern; it is the focal point where theoretical controversy centers. For
example, the stage vs. continuous growth controversy (Flavell, 1971), which dominated
the 1960s,, centered on the problem of growth. In the 1970s, another theoretical con-
troversy has arisen, although not everyone would believe it to be a controversy (Youniss,
1974), between Piagetian "structuralism" and Soviet dialectism as espoused by its Amer-
ican adherents (Riegel, 1975; Wozniak, 1975). This controversy was nicely illustrated
by the football analogy introduced by Gardner (1973) and extended by Riegel (1974). In
order to illustrate the methods of structural analysis used by Levi-Strauss to examine
rituals and orgies of primative societies, Gardner subjected American football to a
similar analysis. There is structure in the field, the rules of the game, and the
strategies of performance. The action is characterized by a sequence of sudden quick
actions each leading to a new structural state where the action appears to be temporar-
ily frozen. Riegel believes this analogy is suitable for capturing the essence of a
structural theory of growth like Piaget's early conceptions. By contrast, Riegel
believes that dialectic theories, such as his own, can best be characterized by analogy
to soccer, a game of ceaseless action which depends on continuous interactions between
the individual members and the transaction between the members of opposing teams.
Soccer, like dialectic theory, is a game of continuous motion; football, like structural
theory, is one of sudden activity producing stable states. The analogy has flats cer-
tainly, but it does illustrate that one of the current controversies in developmental
theory, dialectism vs. Piagetian structuralism, is rooted in the notions of growth and
change. Whether or not these theoretical metaphors ever lead to a concrete increase
in our understanding of human growth, they at least sensitize us to a major problem
for psychological theory.
Although space limitations must restrict my treatment of most aspects of the dia-
lectic approach to human growth, I would like to add one point. Another criticism
leveled against Piagetian theory by the dialectic school is that it concentrates on
biological maturation and individual interactions with objects in the world; the
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impression is that these forces play the primary role in development. By contrast,
Riegel (1975) and his adherents stress the Soviet position that development is largely
the result of socio-historical influences. I believe the difference is only one of
emphasis and the value of both theories is the concentration on the individual, en-
vironment, and the mutual compatibility between the two. Together with many recent
calls for an "ecological psychology" (Brown, 1977, 1978a; Brown & DeLoache, 1978;
Bruner, 1972; Cole & Scribner, 1977; Neisser, 1976a, 1976b; Shaw & Bransford, 1977),
the two major global developmental theories lay stress on the essential importance of
considering ontogenetic and phylogenetic adaptation, as adaptation to dynamic natural
contexts. Human thought is naturally evolving and although this undoubtedly compli-
cates the issue, psychologists eventually rest consider adaptation in reference to
the particular socio-historical context in which the organism has evolved and must
survive.
I would like to end this section with another quote from Neisser. "No theory
that fails to acknowlegde the possibility of development can be taken seriously as
an account of human cognition" (Neisser, 1976a, p. 62). As yet, neither the major
adult or developmental models can satisfactorily account for growth, other than by
postulating a gradual accumulation of facts, accompanied by some unspecified quali-
tative reorganization and restructuring. We are, however, beginning to see frame-
works in which to couch the question, particularly Bransford and Nitsch's (1977) ab-
duction schema, Neisser's (1976a) updated schema theory, Piaget's (1971) inchoate
notions of reflective abstraction nad the ecological theories of Turvey & Shaw (this
volume). The main point of this section was not, unfortunately, to provide new
insights into the problem of growth, but to illustrate that attention to issues of
growth and change should be an essential factor in the formation of our conceptions
about human thought.
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III. Levels of Processing and Developmental Psychology
To have progressed this far in the paper without mentioning levels of processing
(LOP) models might seem somewhat perverse given the theme of the volume but the par-
ticipants were encouraged to consider alternate viewpoints. In the preceding section
I dealt mainly with reasons why developmental psychologists and those concerned with
adult cognition do not generally cross-fertilize each other's theory construction.
In this section I will emphasize why it is that LOP frameworks are the major exception
to this rule. From their very inception the LOP frameworks have been adopted and in-
corporated into the developmental literature. Why should this be so? What distinl
guishes LOP models from other adult models so that they are particularly compatible
with developmental approaches? They certainly do not deal satisfactorily with the
issue of growth, relying as they do on the typical gradual incremental notion. They
bypass the thorny problem of assimilation-accommodation with statements such as "highly
familiar, meaningful stimuli are compatible by definition (emphasis mine) with existing
cognitive structures" (Craik & Lockhart, 1972, p. 676). Although they helped us avoid
some of the less fruitful blind alleys of the container metaphors (Brown & DeLoache,
1978) they still maintain much of the terminology of general-memory metaphors (Bransford
& Franks, 1976). Why then have LOP frameworks been so readily adopted by developmental
theorists?
I have described the major impact of LOP frameworks in previous papers (Brown,
1974, 1975) and Naus and Halasz (this volume) also give an excellent in depth review
of the literature; I do not want to reiterate much of this discussion. I will argue
here that the compatibility between LOP approaches and developmental psychology is due
to the fact that developmental models have always been predominantly LOP frameworks.
Both emphasize three (not independent) main points: (a) the concept of voluntary
versus involuntary memory, (b) the ides that it is the activity of the subject that
determines what is remembered, and (c) headfitting (Brown, 1975; Jenkins, 1971, 1974),
nicely captured in Jenkins' quote: "the head remembers what it does" or is capable of
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doing. These three points are the major issues that guide empirical work in develop-
mental psychology whether the orientation is European (Binet & Henri, 1894; Piaget,
1970), American (Brown, 1975), or Russian (Istomina, 1975; Vygotsky, 1962; Yendovit-
skaya, 1971).
A. Voluntary vs. Involuntary Memory
1. Voluntary & Deliberate learning. A primary distinction made by Soviet devel-
opmental psychologists is that between voluntary and involuntary memory. This is
roughly equivalent to the LOP distinction between incidental and intentional learning.
Voluntary or intentional learning refers to the standard situation in laboratory mem-
ory tests (and schools) where the subject is specifically requested to invoke all
efforts to retain the material. Under such circumstances adults deploy a remarkable
array of ingenious mnemonics even when faced with the most impoverished stimuli or
artificial laboratory tasks (Reitman, 1970); indeed, it is extremely difficult to
interfere with this ingenuity. There is however ample evidence that young children
do not spontaneously employ a variety of strategic methods until the onset of the
grade school years and they continue to refine and extend their repertoire as they
mature. Along with the gradual emergence and refinement of specific memorial strat-
egies, the child's knowledge and control of these processes also develop as he is
faced increasingly with more demanding situations. He learns to evaluate realistically
the task demands (Brown, 1978a, 1978b), his memory ability (Brown, Campione, & Murphy,
1977; Brown & Lawton, 1977; Flavell, Friedtichs, & Hoyt, 1970), and the interaction
of his abilities and the task (Brown & Barclay, 1976). The development of knowledge
about memory, metamemory (Brown, 1975, 1977, 1978a; Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Campione
& Brown, 1977; Flavell & Wellman, 1977), has only recently received attention, however,
such knowledge and beliefs concerning one's own memory processes must play a vital
role in determining if strategies and plans will be adopted and if appropriate plans
will be used. Without such introspective knowledge, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to select an appropriate strategy at the onset of a task and to change or
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modify that strategy in the face of its success or failure.
To illustrate the development of knowledge and control of deliberate strategies
for learning, I will briefly describe some ongoing research from my laboratory concerned
with acquiring information from prose passages (Brown & Smiley, 1977a, 1977b). Our
subject population has ranged from preschoolers as young as three years of age to college
students, and the stories are adapted to suit the different age groups. We find two
main consistencies across age: with or without conscious intent to do so, subjects ex-
tract the main theme of a story and ignore trivia. Even the youngest child's recall
favors the essential action sequences of the story. In addition, children are misled
in their comprehension of stories by the same snares that trap adults (Brown, Smiley,
Day, Townsend & Lawton, 1977). Led to believe certain "facts" concerning a main char-
acter or the location of an action, facts which never appear in the original story,
children disambiguate and elaborate in the same way as adults (Anderson & Reder, this
volume). They false. recognize theme congruent distractors in recognition tests, and
introduce importations from their preexisting knowledge when recalling. Vurthermore,
they have difficulty distinguishing between their own elaborations and the actual story
content.
There are some interesting developmental trends, however, which follow from the
increasingly strategic nature of the older child's study habits. As children mature
they become able to identify the essential organizing features and crucial elements of
texts (Brown & Smiley, 1977a, 1977b). ThanKs to this foreknowledge, they make better
use of extended study time. If given an extra period for study, children from seventh
grade up improve their recall considerably for important elements of text; recall of
less important details does not improve. Children below seventh grade do not usually
show such effective use of additional study time; their recall improves, if at all,
evenly across all levels of importance. As a result, older students' recall protocols
following study include all the essential elements and little trivia. Younger child-
ren's recall, though still favoring important elements, has rmany such elements missing.
21
The older students benefit from increased study time as a direct result of their
strategic intervention which in turn rests on their ability to predict ahead of time
what are important elements of the text. Younger students, not so prescient, cannot
be expected to distribute extra time intelligently; they do not concentrate on only
the important elements, since they do not know in advance what they are. To substantiate
this hypothesis consider the overt study actions of the subjects, in particular, the
physical records they provided, notes and underlining of texts. A certain proportion
of children from fifth grade and up spontaneously underlined or took notes during study.
At all ages, the physical records of spontaneous subjects favored the important ele-
ments; i.e., the notes or underlined sections concentrated on elements of the text
previously rated as crucial to the theme.
Students induced to adopt one of these strategies did not show a similar sensi-
tivity to importance; they took notes or underlined more randomly. Some of the very
young children underlined almost all the text when told to underline! Although the
efficiency of physical record keeping in induced subjects did improve with age, it
never reached the standard set by spontaneous users of the strategy. Furthermore, the
recall scores of spontaneous producers were much superior. Even the few fifth graders
who spontaneously underlined showed an adult-like pattern and used extra study to dif-
ferentially improve their recall of important elements. The relationship between
spontaneous strategy use and effective recall was clear for all ages.
This brief summary of some ongoing research illustrates what I believe to be a
repetitive pattern in cognitive development. What develops with age and experience is
often increasing strategic control over an early emerging process. For example, even
young: children extract the essential gist of a story if they are not misled by red
herrings, such as artificially increased salience of nonessential detail. With in-
creasing experience with such tasks children acquire the learning process and gradually
refine their control over these strategies. Using their knowledge about elements of
texts, their knowledge concerning how to study, and the interface of these two factors,
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older students can become much more efficient when processing information presented in
texts. A similar developmental pattern can be found in many other deliberate (volun-
tary) learning situations (Brown, 1974, 1975).
2. Involuntary Memory or Incidental learning. Involuntary memory is roughly the
equivalent of incidental learning in the LOP framework, and indeed both the Soviet and
American schools distinguish between two main types of involuntary memory. The first
is the product of a deliberate learning task, for the subject is involved in a learning
problem, during which he is exposed to. material which is irrelevant to the task as
specified by the learning instructions. This is a Type II incidental learning situa-
tion according to Postman's (1964) nomenclature. Both American and Soviet (Smirnov &
Zinchenko, 1969; Vygotsky, 1962; Zinchenko, 1962) developmental psychologists have
found the same pattern in children. As they mature, they increasingly attend to informa-
tive and ignore irrelevant aspects of a learning situation.
The second type of incidental learning situation, the Type I task (Postman, 1964),
has generated the most interest within the LOP models. Here the subject is exposed to
the stimulus material but is given no explicit instructions to learn; he interacts
with the material for purposes other than the intent to learn per se. Under these cir-
cumstances, adults (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), as well as children (Istomina, 1975; Murphy
& Brown, 1975; Smirnov & Zinchenko, 1969), retain more information if the orienting
instructions are sufficient to induce optimal processing. The prradigm is of particular
interest to developmentalists because a specific developmental prediction can be made.
As young children are .not noted for the production of effective strategies in response
to instructions to learn, children performing a favorable orienting task should do
better than those under instructions to attempt deliberate learning with no mention of
what strategy they might adopt. Again, both Soviet (Vygotsky, 1962; Zinchenko, 1962),
and American (Murphy & Brown, 1975) developmental psychologists have confirmed this pre-
diction. In Table I we present some representative data. Although the absolute level
Insert Table 1 about here
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of recall varies, as do the experimental procedures, the same pattern is observed.
Intentional learners do more poorly than those performing any of a variety of semantic
orienting tasks. Indeed, they perform at approximately the same level as children
performing formal orienting tasks such as identifying the color of objects or initial
sounds of words.
We have further evidence that it is the deployment of task suitable strategies
that induces effective learning. Thieman (1976), in an unpublished doctoral disser-
tation, divided his intentional learners (adults) into subgroups depending on the strat-
egy they reported using. These data are shown in Table 2. When one considers the corn-
Insert Table 2 about here
bined mean for all intentional learners they appear to be performing as well as in the
most effective semantic orienting conditions, a typical finding in the literature.
However, when one considers the intentional learners, as a function of the strategy
they adopt, the more ingenious tend to perform better than subjects in the best semantic
orienting conditions and the less ingenious tend to perform as poorly as on the worst
semantic orienting task and, indeed, as poorly as in the formal orienting conditions.
These data, taken together with the developmental literature, provide strong support
for the hypothesis that intentional learning instructions are only effective to the
degree that they induce task suitable strategies. Instructions to learn per se are
irrelevant.
As a final example of the interesting interaction of age by voluntary-involuntary
memory conditions, I have chosen one of the original studies conducted with the para-
digm by Zinchenko in approximately 1940 (sec Wertsch, 1977, for translation). This is
a particularly interesting study, not only because its early emergence reinforces a
cyclical notion of history, all the elements of our current incidental-intentional
studies are there, but also because it provides some eviderce of an interaction between
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orienting activity and the nature of the material to be processed, a basic LOP notion.
Adult and child subjects were given sets of four words, each consisting of a target
item (e.g., house) and three associates called logical (e.g., building), concrete (e.g.,
window), or no meaningful connection (fish). These are the only examples given so it
is difficult to specify what a logical or concrete connection is exactly. However, from
the example it looks like they are dealing with taxonomic-superordinate versus thematic
categories (Overcast, Murphy, Smiley, & Brown, 1975). For adult subjects there were
three incidental orienting tasks: underline the word in each set with (a) a logical
connection, (b) a concrete connection, and (c) with no meaningful connection to the tar-
get. The data for immediate (surprise) free recall are given in Table 3. There is an
interaction between type of material and orienting activity. Logical connections are
recalled better than concrete ones, which in turn are recalled better than the unrelated
Insert Table 3 about here
items. Variations in orienting instruction, however, modify this somewhat, for, subjects
seeking concrete connections remember as many concrete words as logical ones. Note
also that the subjects in the no-connection group dramatically improve their recall of
no-connection words. The interaction of material with orienting instruction is an inter-
esting one which is repeated in the data from further groups of adults who performed
the same orienting task together with instructions to learn the specific words they
underline. The degree of retention is a function of both the type of material and the
orienting task of the subject.
The developmental data, also included in Table 3, are incomplete and a little con-
fusing. The pattern for young school children is reasonably clear. Incidental orienting
instructions, if anything, produce better recall than intentional learning situations,
even when the same activity was engaged in by both groups. For older children, the
pattern is more complex. In the incidental condition, the same pattern of results is
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found (with lower overall recall scores), for both adults and children, an interaction
of orienting activity and stimulus type. In the intentional condition, however, a
different pattern emerged. Zinchenko describes these middle school children as just
at the stage when they had gained considerable control of mnemonics of rote recall,
which they applied diligently. But they had great difficulty initially remembering
any of the unrelated words; as a result they devoted considerable extra effort in the
intentional condition, when asked to remember the unrelated words. Subsequently, they
dramatically improved recall of unrelated words at the expense of the logical and con-
crete connections. This is a complicated study and its results can onlybe explained
by recourse to much post hoc speculation (a .clean replication would be welcomed); how-
ever, it does show that the interaction between strategies and material is an interesting
one.
B. Activity and the Goal of Actions
Activity, referred to variously as mental operations or mental activity, is a
central issue for LOP frameworks. Craik and Tulving summarized the literature in 1975:
All these studies conform to the new look in memory research in that the
stress is on mental operations; items are remembered not as presented stimuli
acting on the organism, but as components of mental activity. Subjects re-
member not what was out there but what they did during encoding (Craik &
Tulving, 1975, p. 292).
In its first instantiation this "new" focus on activity involved a somewhat
simplistic conception of good and bad operations that could be performed by the learner.
For example, it was easy to infer from the original descriptions of orienting activities
that semantic ones were good and formal ones were bad. There are at least two problems
with the invited inference. First it suggests a neat dichotomy between the types of
tasks, and second it ignores the necessary relationship between a processing activity
and the goal at hand.
Consider first the dichotomy notion. Semantic orienting tasks were thought to
be those that required the subject to consider the meaning of stimuli, while formal
tasks did not require a consideration of meaning. While the division of orienting
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tasks based on the presence or absence of a requirement to consider meaning has a good
deal of intuitive appeal, this view is not without its difficulties. First is the
problem of determining an appropriate point of division between semantic and nonsem-
antic tasks, for several of the tasks selected appear to fall into a virtual no man's
land. One difficulty of categorizing some tasks is that they can be preformed in sev-
eral ways; so, the tasks themselves are neither semantic nor nonsemantic, but the
operations carried out to perform the ta8ks can be based on either type of strategy.
For example, determining the part of speech of words may be performed either by paying
attention to the morphology or phonology of the words or by considering their meanings.
This is not to imply that the two levels of decision are mutually exclusive, but
differences in emphasis may explain why Hyde and Jenkins (1973) consider this a non-
semantic task, whereas Eagle and Leiter (1964) and Mandler and Worden (1973) consider
it a semantic task, In short, a more reasonable assessment of the type of operations
that can be performed by the learner is that they form a continuum in terms of the
degree of semantic analysis that must be undertaken (Thieman, 1976).
A further problem related to the classification of tasks or underlying processes
as semantic or nonsemantic on the basis of recall performance is the often cited cir-
cular and post hoc nature of this reasoning. Roughly, the argument states that since
semantic or deep processing results in efficient retention, then if an orienting task
produces high retention in incidental learning, it must have entailed semantic proces-
sing. But how strongly should the argument aligning memory and meaningful analysis be
made? The strongest position holds that semantic processing is both a necessary and
sufficient condition for good memory. This view is expressed by Craik and Tulving
(1975), who state "it seems clear that attention to the word's meaning is a necessary
prerequisite of good retention" (p. 269), and that "it now becomes possible to enter-
tain the hypothesis that optimal processing of individual words, qua individual words,
is sufficient to support good recall" (p. 270). An equally extreme alternative position
would be that semantic analysis is neither necessary nor sufficient for good memory,
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but the efficiency of retention is attributable to some other factor, such as the de-
velopment of effective retrieval cues, which may be semantically or non-semantically
related to the presented material.
A compromise between the two positions seems to have been reached (Tulving, this
volume), i.e., recall of a large number of unrelated items will be unsuccessful, re-
gardless of whether the meaning of each item has been considered, unless there exists
some systematic retrieval mechanisms for reinstating those items at recall. Experiments
by Craik and Tulving (1975), Schulman (1975) and Moscovitch and Craik (1975) also pro-
vide strong evidence that under certain circumstances semantic analysis is insufficient
to insure high recall unless the products of this semantic analysis form a "coherent,
integrated unit" which can serve as an effective redintegrative cue at recall (Horowitz
& Prytulak, 1969). The compatibility of encoding and retrieval environments has been
discussed at length by other contributors to this volume (Jacoby & Craik, Tulving &
Bransford, et al).
The controversy concerning encoding-retrieval compatibility was a reaction to the
early attempts of LOP adherents to classify activity irrespective of the goal of that
activity. Postmaa (1975) suggested that there is a significant distinction to be
drawn between deep processing and optimal processing; but optimal can only be defined
in the context of the particular goal of the processing. Optimal processing must be
whatever is most effective in the total context of the subjects' goal-directed activ-
ity; for it is the purposive nature of activities that guides the seledtion of infor-
mation (Cassirer, 1946). Seen in this light, it should not matter where on the formal-
semantic dimension an encoding activity might fall, the crucial variable would be the
compatibility of the activity with the task demands, task demands that include re-
trieval as well as acquisition restraints. Bransford and his collegues (Bransford et
al this volume, Morris, Bransford & 'Franks, 1977) report an experiment in support of
this position, for under certain conditions a typical formal task, rhyming, can be
superior to a typical semantic task, fitting words into sentences. The trick was that
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the "retention" test required the subjects to make use of rhyme relevant information.
The main point is that it is only in the context of what the subject is doing that one
can meaningfully speak of optimal activity. This statement is also a fair representa-
tion of one of the basic tenets of the Soviet theory of activity (Leont'ev, 1974;
Wertsch, 1977; Zinchenko, 1962), that actions, operations, and activities are always
purposive; they do not occur in a vacuum; they occur in the context of some meaningful
goal.
One of the main difficulties of giving a quick sketch of the Soviet theory of
activity is confusion conperning their nomenclature, and I am sure that real devotees
will find much to quarrel with in my usage of terms. The Soviets make quite subtle
distinctions between terms such as activities, actions, acts, operations, motives,
means, and goals. For this reason it is often difficult to follow their discourse,
and I suspect that the problem is exacerbated because the terms, so subtly defined,
originally, are sometimes used interchangeably 'by translators. A detailed review of
the theories can be found elsewhere (Meacham, 1977; Wertsch, 1977); here I will give
my translation of the major positions, changing the terms when necessary to be con-
sistent.
The most difficult term is that of activity itself. Activities are defined as
molar processes by which we
transform objects into subjective forms and make objective the more sub-
jective aspects of personality (cf, assimilation and accomodation in
Piaget's theory). Thus activities structure the relationship of the in-
dividual to his material and social world, and it is through his activities
that the individual is able to understand or give meaning to his external
world (Meacham, 1977, p. 7).
Thus the term activity is used to refer to the assimilation-accomodation interaction
of man and his external world. But it is also used to refer to the current social
pursuit the individual is engaged in. At each stage of development, a particular form
of activity becomes dominant, that is it is the "leading" activity of that stage of
ontogenesis. It is within the context of the leading activity that the major reorgan-
izations of mental processes will occur. For example, it is within the context of
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manipulating objects and developing means of direct emotional communication, the lead-
ing activities of infancy, that the very young child comes to know his world, and to
structure that knowledge. Although the sequence of leading activities will be modified
by the particular environment in which the individual must function, the "normal" pro-
gression described by the Soviets for modern development in schooled societies is man-
ipulation of objects and direct emotional communication, followed by play, then school-
related learning and interpersonal communication, and finally career-related learning
activities (Elkonin, 1972; Kussman, 1976). For example, it is a typical Soviet-in-
spired statement that the leading activity of schools is the development of decontex-
tualized skills of deliberate learning (Brown, 1978a).
Activities, whether leading or otherwise, serve to motivate certain specific
actions (sometimes confusingly called acts), which are directed toward a conscious
goal. A goal-directed action can be performed by means of various operations depending
on the particular task demand. Even these operations might have subparts, sometimes
called acts,associated with them. To interject some well-needed concrete examples,
consider the case of a child, during a play activity of constructing a toy boat, going
to get a list of items needed for that construction. The leading activity of early
childhood is play. The specific goal-directed action the child is currently engaged
in is building the boat. One operation he must perform in order to carry out this
action is remembering the list of items he must fetch, and an act of remembering might
be rehearsal. Note that the operation of remembering here is subordinated to the
action of building a toy; it is not the goal in itself. In another context remembering
could be the goal. For example, consider an older child in a school situation who is
directed to learn a vocabulary list. Here the leading activity of middle childhood
is school-related learning; the specific goal-directed action is rote remembering;
an operation that might be used to accomplish this could be rehearsal. Note two things:
rehearsal, for example, out of context, cannot be designated an act, an operation, or
an action. It can only be defined in terms of its place within the total activity of
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the child in context. Second, note that in both examples, remembering is more or less
deliberate, but in the second it is the goal itself, while in the first it is subor-
dinated to the goal of building a toy. This is an important distinction for the Soviets,
for they believe that actions that are the goal of an activity are better remembered
than thsse that merely help one realize a goal, a point I cannot elaborate here. Fin-
ally, it should be emphasized that the voluntary-involuntary distinction as well as
the definition of an activity can only be made in the context of a purposive goal-
directed pursuit.
Although the terminology of the Russian literature may be less than helpful, the
basic philosophy is simple and entirely compatible with the position that the subjects'
activities are optimal only iL the sense that they are tailored to some goal in a
purposive sequence. Activities are purposive, goal-directed, and occur in natural
contexts. The theory has much in common with that of transfer appropriate processes
developed by Bransford and his collegues (this volume).
Before leaving the Soviet theory of activity, there is one implication that has
particular relevance for developmentalists but also might be informative for those who
deal with adult subjects. The Soviet position that one cannot divorce an activity
from its purpose and that activities take place in natural contexts is beginning to
have an important influence on the way developmental psychologists conduct their in-
vestigations. Developmental psychology as an experimental science is a relatively new
area of specialization in American psychology. Initial forays in this field were very
much influenced by experimental psychology which until the 1960s meant animal experi-
menta'tion. The early questions were borrowed from the animal literature, and children
were set to solve such gripping problems as two-choice discrimination learning tasks
and run for many trials until they reached criterion -- or refused to cooperate. The
experimental situation was also adapted from animal laboratories; a large number of
studies in the 1960s actually used a modified Wisconsin General Test Apparatus -- a sort
of cage developed by Harlow for testing monkeys. That children were also enclosed in
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boxes was presumably a safeguard to protect the purity of the experimental demands, for
I assume children in the 1960s were not rabid and, therefore, the physical protection
of the experimenter could not have been a prime motivation. To complete the child as
animal metaphor, it was a typical practice to place stimuli over reward wells which
were baited (with M&Ms, the developmentalist's lab chow). All social or verbal inter-
actions with the child were minimized, and any suggestion of a purpose for the activity
was reduced to the plea to the child to "come play my game."
Children were notoriously unreliable accomplices; the variability in their data
suggested perversity rather than compliance. Even if they reached solution, they were
too temperamental to maintain a criterion run. The language, the experimental setup
and the task were all inspired by the animal metaphor. Children usually outperformed
animals but they still performed abysmally, and the resultant view of the young child
was negative; he was not a producer, not strategic, did not mediate, did not transfer
rules, etc. (Brown & DeLoache, 1978).
With the wide dissemination of the Russian developmental literature, American
psychologists have begun to consider children's competencies in more naturalistic sit-
uations. Observational and clinical methods are being combined with experimentation in
an innovative way, and it is becoming commonplace for developmental psychologists to
at least pay lip service to the need to evaluate a child's potential in a meaningful
situation. Soviet psychologists have always conducted their developmental inquiries in
this manner. For example, Istomina (1975), in a study conducted in the early 1940s,
examined how children would go about remembering a five item list. Americans will
tell you that under normal laboratory learning instructions one can expect about two
items from cooperative three-year-olds. But one of the most interesting features of
Istomina's experiment was a comparison between children's memory for lists of words in
the relatively standard list-learning situation vs. their memory for comparable lists
embedded in a meaningful (to the child) activity of buying items at a store. Istomina's
reasoning for contrasting these two conditions was the standard Soviet contention that
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"the development of retention and recall as internal, purposeful acts takes place
initially as part of a broader, articulated, and meaningful activity (since it is only
within the context of such activity that the specific acts of remembering and recall
have any meaning for a child)" (p. 8-9).. This hypothesis was confirmed as recall was
clearly superior in the game situation, for younger children, recall was twice as good
when buying items at a store than in a typical rote learning situation.
Istomina not only recorded the objective data produced in each condition, she also
observed the activities of the children as they undertook the task, thus providing a
rich clinical picture of the developing skills. To extract some examples: Three-
year-old Valerik barely waited for the list of items to be read before rushing off to
the store. The three-year-old:'s view of the game seems to be limited to assuming the
role of going to the store and returning with items, but does not seem to include the
notion of bringing back the specific items on the list. Four-year-old Igor listened
attentively to the shopping list, and then tried to carry out his errand as quickly as
possible. He even seemed to try to avoid distraction, refusing to stop and talk when
on his way to the store. Very few four-year-olds showed more specific mnemonic be-
haviors, but between four and five a qualitative shift seemed to occur, and all the
older subjects seemed to make active attempts to remember. Some five- and six-year-
olds actively rehearsed; they were often observed moving their lips, repeating the
words over to themselves as the experimenter read them and as they walked to the store.
Many of the older children seemed to be ronitoring their own memory states and
even checking themselves to determine how well they would remember. Some children
were even seen testing themselves on the way to the store. Finally, the oldest children
(six-seven years old) displayed quite sophisticated strategies of trying to form
logical connections between the items on their lists, often rearranging the order of
the words based on their meaning.
Istomina's (1975) work is fascinating not just for the information it provides
about young children's memory processes, but also for the methodological point it em-
phasizes. The best situation in which to study very early memory development is in a
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natural context in which the child is likely to understand the task and be motivated
to perform it. The young child's performance on laboratory tasks is often markedly
inferior to his performance in a game setting. Although this variable is crucially
important when studying very young children, the same general point is applicable to
other ages as well. Subjects of any age, even adults, are likely to perform better
in a meaningful task in which rhey are actively engaged. Mental acts occur in living
contexts, and, to reiterate a previous theme of this paper, the minimum unit of anal-
ysis must be the operations performed by an individual in context (Neisser, 1976a).
This is an extremely important point for developmentalists who must consider intel-
ligent behavior of children in terms of the naturally occuring contexts of early
childhood (Brown, 1975, 1978a) or divergent cultures (Brown, 1977, 1978a; Cole &
Scribner, 1975). But the message might have some import for theories of adult cog-
nition, particularly varieties such as LOP models, with their explicit concern with
the influence of activities on levels of knowing.
C. Headfitting
The final point of compatibility between developmental psychology and LOP frame-
works is a concern for headfitting (Brown, 1975; Jenkins, 1971, 1974). Again, I have
dealt with this topic elsewhere (Brown, 1975), and Naus and Helasz (this volume) have
a detailed overview of the problem. Here I will restrict myself to three points:
headfitting as a source of error variance; headfitting for instructional purposes;
and headfitting and the problem of meaning.
First, what do I mean by headfitting? The basic premise is that there is an
intimate relation between what is known and what can be known, and because we must
come to know more with increasing age and experience, there must be a close corres-
pondence between what a child can understand at any point in his life and his con-
current cognitive status. The typical position of both adult and developmental
const'ructivists is that meaning does not reside in the world, it is constructed from
the interaction between the current state of knowledge and that which is to be known.
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As we have seen, there are philosophical problems with this position (Sections II. D.
and E.) which I will not reiterate here. But, the very concept of meaning for those
of a constructivist persuasion is one of headfitting. LOP frameworks have always
incorporated a headfitting notion, reflected in terms such as "compatibility (of
material) with the analyzing structures." In more recent instantiations of the LOP
approach (Lockhart, Craik, & Jacoby, 1975) the proponents become more explicitly em-
broiled in the problem, as they address the question of "automatic" encoding for
material highly compatible with the preexisting contents of the head.
How have developmental psychologists been concerned with the headfitting issue?
Experimental psychologists often operate as if they wished to control for it, e.g.,
they regard developmental variations in knowledge as a source of extraneous variabil-
ity. Fo r example, in standard memory tasks they attempt to insure that even their
youngest subjects are familiar with the stimuli, at least to the level that they can
name them. If a name is not readily given by a small participant, the experimenter
generously provides one, and then operates as if stimulus familiarity were equated
across ages (see Chi, 1978, for a full treatment of this problem). That familiarity
may involve more than access, or even speed of access to the name code is rarely con-
sidered. Variations in performance across ages can now be attributed to factors other
than variations in knowledge, e.g., capacity limitations or strategy deficits (Chi, 1976).
A more enlightened way that developmental psychologists have expressed concern
with the headfitting problem has been in their treatment of instruction. If one wishes
to instruct a child to perform in a way he previously could not, the most intelligent
way co proceed is to find out where his head is at initially. Developmental psychol-
ogists interested in instruction have typically indulged in detailed task analyses that
map the progression of the child as he moves toward adult-like understanding. Such
task analyses provide detailed specifications of feasible rules for solution, and sys-
tematic error patterns are used to diagnose the child's pretraining competencies, areas
of weakness, etc. so that instructional routines can be tailored to fit the diagnosee
(Siegler, 1976).
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It is widespread assumption of developmental psychologists of quite divergent
theoretical viewpoints that the distance between the child's existing knowledge and
the new information he must acquire is a critical determinant of how successful training
will be (Brown, 1975; Inhelder, Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974; Piaget, 1971; Siegler, 1976).
Near training, i.e., training aimed at just one level above a child's starting knowledge
is far more successful than far training, aimed at least two levels beyond the child's
understanding (Siegler, 1976). Thus, it is a critical concern for those involved in
instruction to detail the stages through which the learner must pass. And the map be-
tween the child's current understanding and the instructional routine is a critical
determinant of what instruction will be introduced - a practical headfitting problem.
The third headfitting issue is the "task by head" interaction stressed by many
developmental theorists. A task is easy or hard, material is comprehensible or not,
to the extent that it maps onto the preexisting knowledge and preferences of the
learners. Extreme versions of this approach suggest that if material is highly com-
patible, understanding will be "automatic" (Brown, 1975; Jenkins, 1974) and that both
comprehension and memory are born of meaning (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). One way that
the developmental literature has been influenced by this position is that there has
been a shift towards studying such phenomena as semantic integration, inferential
reasoning, etc. in the context of meaningful materials such as prose passages. It is
as if turning to prose is by itself a reflection of concern for meaning. As Jenkins
(1974) pointed out in his seminal treatment of the psychologist definition of meaning,
what one regards as meaningful is very much a matter of historical press. In their
time those concerned with memory for words looked askance at retrogressive advocates
of the nonsense syllable. Now it is trendy to berate those who look at words, or even
sentences, for meaning is carried in larger chunks of texts. But if meaning is not in
the material but in the compatibility of the subject's level of understanding and the
nature of the material, then changing stimulus types does not help or hinder the basic
question. Even for the learner attempting to acquire nonsense syllables the basic unit
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of analysis is the relationship of his prior knowledge, his current activity, and the
material. Both LOP frameworks and developmental theories that espouse a headfitting
notion must somehow deal with the problem of meaning, where meaning is defined as one
of task and subject compatibility.
The ultimate demonstration of the headfitting notion is one that should be readily
found in the developmental literature. Ideally, little thinkers lacking some basic
knowledge should be hindered in their comprehension of any information that presupposes
the existence of that prior knowledge. While this is undoubtedly true, it has proved
difficult to demonstrate the phenomenon neatly within well controlled experiments. The
main thrust of the Piagetian work on the development of memory has been to demonstrate
the close alliance of preexisting knowledge and memory (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). These
experiments have not been totally successful.
Another ploy is to show that experimentally induced preexisting knowledge deter-
mines what is understood. While this has been successfully demonstrated with both
children (Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend, & Lawton, 1977) and adults (Anderson & Pichert,
1977), no interesting developmental trends have been identified; even the younger
children disambiguated vague or misleading sections of text in a manner congruent with
their preexisting expectations. Indeed it is not necessary in the standard Bartlett
prose recall situation to manipulate age as well as preexisting knowledge. Inducing
adults to take different perspectives before reading a passage is an ideal way of dem-
onstrating that comprehension is an interaction of expectations and actual textual
materials (Anderson & Pichert, 1977; Bower, 1977). Thus, while we have ample anec-
dotal evidence that the younger reader's comprehension is effected by a limited knowl-
edge base, e.g., reports that children read stories in terms of the concrete action
sequences rather than the deeper allegorical meaning (Brown, 1978b), we do not have
neat experimental evidence of the ideal type -- little heads leading to little under-
standing.
What we do have is the inverse of the ideal finding, and it is just as pertinent
to my argument; indeed, it may be more so because it is so dramatic. In a recent
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series of studies, Chi (1978) has been investigating the memory and metamemory perform-
ance of skilled chess players, an honorable psychological pursuit dating back at least
to Binet (1894). Chi's twist is that in her sample of players knowledge is orthogonal
to age. In general the children are the experts while the adults are the novices. It
is the experts who outperform the novices both in terms of actual memory performance
and in predicting in advance how well they will perform -- a nice example of the head-
fitting notion. It is not how old your head is but how much it has experienced in a
particular cognitive domain.
IV. Summary
In view of the traditional separation of developmental theories from current
adult models the widespread adoption of LOP frameworks is particularly noteworthy. I
have suggested here that the essential compatibility of LOP models and developmental
interests follows from a shared concern with three main issues, involuntary memory,
activity and headfitting. Developmental data are often particularly apt demonstrations
of the main tenets of the LOP frameworks and LOP models provide a language and a view-
point through which the issues of interest for developmentalists can be reinterpreted.
Another theme of this chapter is that thinking systems are naturally evolving and
theories of cognition must eventually consider how their model of man came about. The
teleological position has been fruitful in guiding research but it is not surprising
that any theory that can account for only a limited subset of adult behavior on a set
of severely constrained tasks, may have difficulty dealing with the questions of growth
and change. A consideration of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic forces that shape the
evolution of thought might lead to a richer understanding of how humans come to know
the significant information of their environment.
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Table 1
Proportion Correct Recall by Intentional and
Incidental Learners: Preschool Children
Condition Study la Study 2a  Study 3b
Intentional Learning .33 .22 .44
Semantic Orienting Tasks
Categorize .49 .41 .64





aAdapted from Murphy & Brown (1975).
bAdapted from Zinchenko (1962).
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Table 2
Mean Proportion Correct Recall of Intentional Learners
as a Function of Strategy Adapted (from Thieman, 1976)
Group Strategy Experiments
1 12 3
Intentional Learners (a) Stories, Sentences,
or Scenes .67 .59 .46
(b) Interitem Associates
or Categories .36 .48 .45
(c) Rote Rehearsal .30 .37 .34
Total .44 .48 .42
Incidental Learners 1  (a) Semantic Orientation .33-.46 .38-.49 .44-.51
(b) Formal Orientation -- .30-.35 .31
1The incidental learners are included for comparative reasons. The orienting
tasks varied widely across studies. Included here is the range between the
least and most effective conditions.
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Table 3
From P. I. Zinchenko, Involuntary Memory (1962)
College Student Data
Orienting Condition Incidental Intentional
Instructions Logical Concrete None Logical Concrete None
Material
Logical 7.0 5.9 5.2 7.1 5.2 4.8
Concrete 4.7 5.2 4.5 4.1 5.4 4.4
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